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The EU’s post-Brexit policy on euro clearing
explained
The UK’s withdrawal from the EU has reignited concern about the long-standing ‘tug of war’ over the clearing of
euro-denominated instruments – first and foremost, derivatives. Scott James (KCL) and Lucia Quaglia
(University of Bologna) explain the EU’s post-Brexit policy on euro clearing.
Clearing is the process by which a ‘clearing house’, also called a ‘central counter party’ (CCP), acts as the
middleman for both the buyer and the seller of a financial instrument. Clearing is crucial for financial stability and
the effectiveness of monetary policy. It is also a lucrative financial activity, especially for derivatives, and it is an
important source of tax revenue and employment for those financial jurisdictions in which a large volume of trades
are cleared. Since the bulk of clearing in Europe as well as internationally takes place in the UK, the tug of war for
euro clearing has implications for the regulation and functioning of derivatives markets worldwide.
At the height of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area in July 2011, the European Central Bank (ECB) issued a
policy paper calling for CCPs that cleared a significant proportion of euro-denominated financial instruments to be
located in the euro area. The proposal was strongly opposed by UK policy-makers, keen to retain the profitable
euro clearing business in the City of London. Although the UK successfully challenged the ECB’s plans before the
European Court of Justice (ECJ), efforts to revive the so-called ‘location policy’ for euro clearing gathered pace
following the Brexit vote. The tug of war for euro clearing concerned two inter-related aspects: the location of third-
country CCPs clearing transactions in euros (or, to be precise, the ‘recognition’ of such CCPs, whereby financial
operators in the EU would not be allowed to use ‘non-recognised’ CCPs) and the supervision of CCPs, within and
without the EU. These issues were sources of significant contestation not only between the EU/euro area and the
UK, but also between the EU and the United States (US), as well as within the EU/euro area itself.
At the beginning of the Brexit negotiations, it was widely expected that euro clearing would eventually be moved out
of London. Yet, the legislation provisionally agreed by the EU in April 2019 (the so-called EMIR 2.0) rowed back
significantly from the ECB’s original location policy, as it envisaged that third country ‘systemically important’ CCPs
would be subject to stricter regulatory requirements and strengthened EU-level supervision. If the requirements
were insufficient to mitigate the potential risks, ‘substantially systemically important’ CCPs would be derecognised
and would be authorised to provide services to EU customers only if the CCPs were (re)located in the EU.
Importantly, however, additional safeguards where inserted, so as to make the derecognition of CCPs in third
countries (first and foremost, in the UK) as the very last resort.
The EU’s resistance to introducing a strict location policy for euro clearing is puzzling in several respects. Euro
clearing has significant implications for financial stability across the EU, and the effectiveness of monetary policy
within the euro area. It is also an important source of tax revenue and employment for those financial jurisdictions in
which a large volume of trades are cleared. We would, therefore, expect the main EU authorities (the Commission,
the ECB, and the European Securities and Markets Authority [ESMA]) to push strongly for the relocation of euro
clearing to the EU after Brexit. Member states with large financial centres (notably, France, Germany and Italy),
together with their established CCPs, also stood to gain considerably from greater third country restrictions. How
can we explain this?
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We argue that conventional political economy explanations provide only a partial answer. For example, national
economic interests do a good job of explaining the concerted push by French and German policy-makers, and their
respective financial centres, to adopt euro clearing restrictions. They also account for why the UK and the US
policy-makers, allied with their national financial industries, sought to resist euro clearing restrictions. In practice,
however, US and UK regulators had divergent preferences on crucial aspects of CCP regulation, and their efforts to
lobby against the changes were viewed as ineffectual. Opposition from US and UK regulators therefore provides an
unsatisfactory account of why the EU chose to resist Franco-German pressure to relocate euro clearing.
What about the role of the financial industry? Quiet opposition certainly did come from a small number of French
and German ‘dealer’ banks, responsible for the bulk of trading in derivatives, which lobbied the Commission and
Parliament against the increased costs of market fragmentation. Problematically, however, EU-based CCPs
(notably, those in France, Germany and Italy) strongly favoured relocation as they were well placed to attract
business away from London, while financial and non-financial end-users of derivatives were weakly organised.
There is therefore little evidence of a powerful, unified transnational coalition of financial interests mobilised against
new euro clearing restrictions.
To get a fuller picture of the EU’s post-Brexit policy on euro clearing, an understanding of the complex inter-
institutional politics of EU financial regulation is essential. We argue that the EU’s cautious approach was shaped in
large part by bureaucratic competition – or tug of war – between the Commission, the ECB and ESMA, as well as
national regulators, over the location and supervision of CCPs. In particular, the outcome of EMIR II reflected the
need to reconcile divergent bureaucratic interests and policy preferences. Hence, the Commission had long been
sceptical of relocation on the grounds that this would threaten the integrity of the single market, and would impose
significant economic costs on EU27 banks. Instead, it preferred to strengthen the EU’s third country equivalence
regime to give the Commission powers equivalent to US regulators. By contrast, the ECB strongly supported
relocation to the euro area on financial stability grounds, and demanded greater powers of oversight for itself over
clearing. Meanwhile, ESMA made a concerted push to increase its own powers by advocating the centralised
supervision of EU and non-EU CCPs. Crucially, these inter-institutional battles are also embedded in fundamental
questions about the future of euro area integration, and the relationship between EU27 and euro area institutions.
Ultimately, it was the need to balance these competing bureaucratic interests that explains why the EU resisted
pressure to introduce a strict location policy in response to Brexit.
A longer version of this blog is published here: Scott James and Lucia Quaglia (2019) ‘Brexit and the political
economy of euro-denominated clearing’, Review of International Political Economy, DOI:
10.1080/09692290.2019.1699148.
This post represents the views of the authors and not those of the Brexit blog, nor LSE.
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